Indeed, notes Krepinevich, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—and the military’s high command more broadly—is already actively developing the weapons and forces necessary to deny the . its ability to operate from its forward bases in the Pacific, such as the air base on Okinawa. Moreover, the PLAN is directing its area-denial capabilities at the . military’s “freedom of action in the seas, out to…the second island chain,” which stretches east of the Philippines and Japan through Guam.  Restricting . movement close to Japan or Taiwan would be problematic. Restricting . movement so close to Guam though, could prove a major issue. After all, Guam is home to Andersen Air Force Base, which houses more weaponry than any other base in the Pacific, and more fuel than any in the world. The small . territory in the western Pacific also features an expanding naval base, with a submarine squadron. Said simply, Guam’s strategic significance is critical for . force projection in the Pacific. As . forces at Guam grow, the Chinese may try harder to intimidate, threaten, or otherwise neutralize the island.