East german trench coat

Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius postulates in his book War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World War I , that a line can be traced from Ober Ost ' s policies and assumptions to Nazi Germany 's plans and attitudes towards Eastern Europe. His main argument is that "German troops developed a revulsion towards the 'East', and came to think of it as a timeless region beset by chaos, disease and barbarism", instead of what it really was, a region suffering from the ravages of warfare. [7] He claims that the encounter with the East formed an idea of 'spaces and races' that needed to be "cleared and cleansed". Although he has garnered a great deal of evidence for his thesis, including government documents, letters and diaries, in German and Lithuanian, there are still problems with his work. For example, he does not say much about the reception of German policies by native populations. [7] Also, he "makes almost no attempt to relate wartime occupation policies and practice in Ober Ost to those in Germany's colonial territories overseas". [7]

The M1942 design was a result of wartime demands. The rolled edge on the shell was eliminated, creating an unfinished edge along the rim. This edge slightly flared out, along the base of the skirt. The elimination of the rolled edge expedited the manufacturing process and reduced the amount of metal used in each helmet. Shell paint colors were typically matte grey-green (Heer) or grey-blue (Luftwaffe), and the decals were eliminated in 1943 to speed up production and reduce the helmet's combat visibility. Greater manufacturing flaws were also observed in M1942 helmets made late in the war. [23]

Buttressed by their massive defensive positions, the Germans counterattacked, hitting the 39th and 60th regiments hard. Nevertheless, aided by tanks from the 3rd Armored Division, the Americans slowly forged ahead. The Germans, however, rushed in reinforcements to confront the deepest penetration by the GIs, the town of Germeter, three miles from the strategic hub of Schmidt. From October 6-16 the 9th Division gained about 3,000 yards at a cost of some 4,500 men killed, wounded or missing. Having battled its way only a short distance into the forest, the 9th Division was exhausted. To relieve the division, the First Army commander, Courtney Hodges, next called on the 28th Division, a Pennsylvania National Guard outfit that had several months of combat under its cartridge belts. The division, led by Maj. Gen. Norman ‘Dutch’ Cota, prepared to renew the drive toward Schmidt. The 28th, part of Maj. Gen. Leonard Gerow’s V Corps, was close to full strength, having recently received several thousand replacements. For added punch, Cota could also call on support from the 707th Tank Battalion. The infantrymen and tankers had little experience working together however. Tank commander 1st Lt. Raymond Fleig commented: ‘You’d never know we were in the same Army. We married up with the infantry on the run. There was little or no coordination of communication [or] routes of attack.’

East german trench coat

east german trench coat


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